Levels, Time and Fitness in Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality by Bourrat, Pierrick
In this  paper, I identify two major problems with the model of evolutionary transitions in 
individuality (ETIs) developed by Michod and colleagues, and extended by Okasha, 
commonly referred to as  the “export-of-fitness  view”. First, it applies  the concepts  of 
viability and fertility inconsistently across  levels  of selection. This  leads  Michod to claim 
that once an ETI is  complete, lower-level entities composing higher-level individuals  have 
nil fitness. I argue that this  claim is  mistaken, propose a correct way to translate the 
concepts  of viability and fertility from one level to the other and show that once an ETI is 
complete, neither viability nor fertility of the lower level entities  is  nil. Second, the export-
of-fitness  view does  not sufficiently take the parameter of time into account when 
estimating fitness  across levels  of selection. As  a result fitness  is  measured over different 
periods  of time at each level. This  ultimately means that fitness  is  measured in different 
environmental conditions  at each level and misleads Okasha into making the claim that 
the two levels  are ontologically distinct levels  of selection. I show that once fitness  is 
measured over the same period of time across  levels, the claim about two levels  of 
selection can only be an epistemic one.
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1. Introduction
Yes, fitness is the central concept of evolutionary biology, but it is an elusive concept. Almost 
everyone who looks at it seriously comes out in a different place. (Leigh Van Valen 1989,2-3)
ETIs are events in the course of evolution that lead to the formation of new higher level individuals due to 
the cooperation of two or more individuals at a lower level  of organization (Michod 2011). One example of an 
ETI is the transition from uni- to multicellular organisms. A number of other ETIs have been proposed, among 
them the transitions from prokaryote to eukaryote cells and from multicellular organisms to integrated colonies 
(such as colonies of ants or honeybees). The most accomplished model of ETIs is certainly the one proposed 
by Michod and colleagues. In a number of articles and books (Michod 1999, 2005; Michod, Nedelcu, & Roze 
2003; Michod, Viossat, Solari, Hurand, & Nedelcu 2006) they detail the necessary conditions for an ETI to 
occur. Okasha (2006, 2011) has recently set Michod and colleagues’ work in the framework of multilevel 
selection 1 (MLS1)/ multilevel selection 2 (MLS2).
Okasha’s  and Michod’s  models  of ETIs  are committed to a concept of fitness which is measured by the 
ability of a given entity to survive (viability) and reproduce given that it has  survived (fertility) in its 
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environment. According to this  definition, the higher the product of viability and fertility of an entity is, the 
higher its  fitness  is  (see Sober 2001 for more on the way of conceptualizing fitness). Although much debate 
exists  in the literature about the status  of fitness  (Ariew & Lewontin 2004; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Krimbas 
2004; Sober 2001) and whether ‘fitness’ consistently refers  to the same concept (Michod 1999, 222), I will 
accept this  definition as  common ground for the development of my arguments. The main aim of this 
article is  to argue against Michod’s  and Okasha’s  view of ETIs  and more precisely against two specific 
claims  defended by both authors. After having briefly reviewed Michod and colleagues’ as  well as  Okasha’s 
models  of ETIs  with respect to fitness, I will present these two claims: (1) during the last stage of an ETI, 
once a division of labor is  in place, the fitness  of the entities  constituting the newly emerged individual 
becomes nil; (2) there are two fundamentally distinct processes of selection, namely multilevel selection 1 
(MSL1) and multilevel selection 2 (MLS2), occurring alternately at the different stages of  an ETI.
Claim (1) has  recently been briefly criticized by Godfrey-Smith (2011, 77-78) for its  metaphorical nature. 
In Section 3, I propose a more thorough examination of this claim and show first that Michod and 
colleagues’ model relies  on an assumption regarding fitness  of the higher-level entity (hereafter the 
“collective”) that is  inconsistent with the claim made about the fitnesses  of the lower level entities  (hereafter 
the “particles”).1 I claim that an ambiguity surrounding the concept of viability (fertility) of the particle/
viability (fertility) of the collective exists  in Michod’s  and Okasha’s  writings  and creates  the illusion that the 
fitness  of the particle can be nil while the fitness  of the collective is high. I also propose that even in cases 
where the fertility of the particles  is  literally nil, the concept of reproduction used by Michod and Okasha 
relies  too much, although not explicitly, on material overlap such as  is  proposed by Griesemer (2000). I argue 
that this  material overlap is  unnecessary for Darwinian evolution to occur. Expanding on Godfrey-Smith 
(2009) and his  concept of formal reproduction I show that somatic cells  of multicellular organisms  formally 
reproduce and consequently that their fitness is not nil. 
In Section 4, I turn to claim (2) and demonstrate that if fitness  is  assessed over the same period of time 
at the collective level and at the level of its  particles, then there most likely is  commensurability between 
selection at the particle and collective level during an ETI. For that reason, they should not be claimed to 
represent two ontologically distinct processes  of selection. I propose rather that they represent two ways of 
describing one and the same process  from the perspective of two spatial and temporal scales. I do not deny 
the epistemological virtues  of describing ETIs within the MLS1/MLS2 framework, but ultimately conclude 
that, so far, there is no clear evidence to support the claims given by Okasha about ontology.2
2. Michod and Okasha on Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality
Michod (2005) proposes  the following model of ETIs. For new individuals at the collective level to 
emerge from the particle level (e.g. for multicellular organisms  to emerge from unicellular organisms) two 
things  must happen. First, conflicts  between members  of the collective need to be resolved. Two ways  this 
can come about are the presence of policing mechanisms  in the collective and the presence of 
developmental bottlenecks during life cycles. These two mechanisms  lead to genetic homogeneity that 
reduces  genetic conflict between the cells  of an adult multicellular organism. However, even if genetic 
homogeneity between the different members  of the same group is  reached, this  will not necessarily lead to 
the emergence of a higher level individual. For an ETI to take place, Michod (2005) proposes  that there 
must be a division of labor between germ and soma (or its  equivalent in ETIs  other than from uni- to 
multicellular organisms), since without this  division of labor, he argues, the collective fitness  will remain 
strictly proportional to the average particle fitness. As  such, the collective will not be an individual with its 
own fitness (Michod 2005, 569); its  fitness  will merely be a cross-level by-product3 of its  particles’ fitnesses. 
Thus, for Michod, the concept of  individuality involves irreducibility of  fitness at that level.
2.1. Claim 1
Michod defines  the fitness  of an entity (whether particle or collective) as  the product of its  viability and 
fertility, as  it is  often done in life-history models. When a cell is  not specialized, it invests  its  resources  in both 
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the viability and fertility components  of fitness. As  a result its  fitness  is  positive. However, when a cell invests 
everything in viability or everything in fertility, its  fitness  becomes nil because its  product of viability and 
fertility is  zero. Michod (2005, 2011) and Okasha (2009) both generalize this  argument to other ETIs  and 
propose that:
(1) If a particle invests everything in the somatic (or germ) function (or its  equivalent) of the future 
collective individual, that particle’s fitness  will be nil since although its  viability (or fertility) will be 
positive, its fertility (or viability), and consequently the product of  viability and fertility, will be nil. 
Conversely, they propose that when the two types  of particles combine their investment in both components 
of fitness  (one investing everything in the soma and the other everything in the germ function) a new 
collective individual emerges  with its  own fitness. This  reasoning leads  Michod to claim that during an ETI, 
there is a transfer or export of  fitness from the particle to the collective level. 
2.2. Claim 2
Okasha (2006) and Michod (2005, 2011), mostly relying on Okasha’s  analysis, both link this  work to the 
two concepts  of multilevel selection distinguished by Damuth and Heisler (1988), namely MLS1 and MLS2. 
In the MLS1 framework, the focal unit of selection is  the particle. For that reason fitness  is  expressed as  a 
number of particles  produced. One collective has  a higher fitness 1 than another if ceteris paribus it produces 
more particles. In the MLS2 framework, the focal units  of selection are both the particle and the collective. 
Fitnesses  of the collective and of the particle are measured in different units. The fitness 2 of a collective is 
expressed as the number of new collectives  it produces  independently of the number of particles  composing 
each collective, while the fitness of a particle is  simply expressed as  the number of particles  it produces. It 
should be noted that this  way of presenting the MLS1/MLS2 framework is  a simplification of Damuth and 
Heisler’s  (1988) original framework. Under their framework, not only do fitnesses  refer to different variables, 
but in a MLS1 process the character under selection is  a particle character, while in a MLS2 case the 
character under selection is  a collective character. Following this  latter approach, it might be justified to claim 
that MLS2 is ontologically different from MLS1. My targets  in the present article are Michod’s  and 
Okasha’s interpretations of  the MLS1/MLS2 framework.
Okasha (2006, 237-238) proposes  that an ETI can be schematically decomposed into three temporal 
stages  for which MLS1 and MLS2 are alternately more relevant to describe the selection process(es) 
occurring at that stage. According to Okasha, in the first stage of an ETI the particles of the future collective 
start to aggregate and cooperate. The fitness  of this  newly formed collective is  merely the average of the 
particles’ fitnesses, hence MLS1 is  the relevant type of selection occurring. During the second stage, the 
fitness  of the collective is  not defined in terms  of the particles  any more, but is  proportional to the average of the 
particles' fitnesses. At that stage, although the MLS2 framework can be applied, so can the MLS1 
framework. There is  a “grey area between MLS1 and MSL2”, in Okasha’s  words (2006, 237). However, the 
collective lacks  individuality, since its  fitness  is  a cross-level byproduct of the particles’ fitnesses. During the 
third stage, when the transition is  complete, the fitness  of the collective cannot be expressed as  the average 
fitness  of the particles  any more. The collective is  now an individual on its  own and its  fitness  is  not 
proportional to the fitness  of the particles; both fitnesses  are now incommensurable.4 This  leads  Okasha to 
propose that: 
(2) MLS1 and MLS2 are two ontologically distinct causal processes of selection, as  opposed to two 
conventional ways  of expressing selection (2006, 59; 2011, 243). During an ETI, they represent a 
transition in processes  of selection. Not only are MLS1 and MSL2 alternately more relevant at the 
different stages  of an ETI, they are alternately the only way to accurately describe those processes  of 
selection.
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3. Particles with Nil Fitness?
In the previous  section I presented (1), the claim that for an ETI from uni- to multicellular organisms (or 
more generally from particle to collective) to be successful, cells  must renounce their individuality by 
specializing either in the soma or the germ function of this  higher level individual. As a consequence of this 
specialization, Michod claims, their fitness taken separately is nil. Godfrey-Smith (2011, 77-78) briefly 
comments  that this  way of speaking about fitness  is  metaphorical. Indeed, he remarks  that even in a 
paradigmatic case of multicellular organisms germ cells do not have a viability nil and many somatic cells 
divide, hence their fertility is not nil either.
In this section, I start by making Godfrey-Smith’s  remark more precise and show that one assumption in 
Michod and colleagues’ model, namely that the viability and fertility of the multicellular organism are fully 
and only dependent respectively on the viability and fertility of the cells  it is  composed of, is  clearly 
misleading. At that stage, it will become clear that Michod and Okasha confuse viability and fertility of the 
cells with viability and fertility of the multicellular organism. Intuitively, it might make sense to consider the 
fitness  of somatic cells  as  nil. However, in the second part of this  section I show that even if the fertility of 
somatic cells can be conceptualized as nil, this  comes from the fact that Michod and Okasha have a classical 
understanding of the concept of reproduction which involves  material overlap (for more on reproduction 
with material overlap see Griesemer 2000, 2014), which in Godfrey-Smith’s  view unnecessarily constrains 
the idea of evolution by natural selection. Following Godfrey-Smith, I propose a broader concept of 
reproduction, namely formal reproduction (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 79-81), to be used when describing 
foundational Darwinian processes  such as  ETIs. I show that if the concept of formal reproduction is  used to 
measure the fitness  of somatic cells  in multicellular organism, they do not have a fitness  nil because they 
formally reproduce.
3.1. Viability and fertility at different levels 
Once an ETI from uni- to multicellular organisms  with germ soma separation is  completed, both types 
of cell in the organism cannot exist in the long term without each other. Without germ cells, the organism 
would sooner or later die without being able to reproduce. Without somatic cells, the organism could not 
survive long enough to reproduce. From a multicellular-organism perspective, it is  therefore correct to state 
that without taking both the germ and somatic lines  into account to measure fitness  at the multicellular level, 
the fitness  of the organism after one generation would be nil. But that claim is  a different one from the one 
made by Michod and colleagues, which is  that the fitness  of the cells becomes nil once the ETI is  completed 
(Michod 2005). There is  obviously a sense in which the fitness  of such a cell could be assumed to be nil. This 
would be when the fitness of a cell refers  to the fitness  that this  cell would have had in the absence of a cell-
group environment. But this  definition of fitness  cannot play any causal role in ETIs. This  is  because a 
situation in which cells  have no cell-group environment does  not correspond to an actual situation 
encountered by the cells. In fact, the cells  that Michod claims have a nil fitness  are always  (or at least most of 
the time) surrounded by a cell-group environment. It thus  seems incorrect to claim that their fitness  is nil and 
would be more accurate to claim that their fitness  would have been nil. Making this sort of counterfactual 
claims  can be useful in explanations but cannot be invoked for claims about ontology. Similarly, claiming that 
you would have had a nil fitness  if you had not received milk from your mother does  not mean that your 
fitness  is nil, although it could be a useful claim to make for some particular explanation. Thus, although it 
might be justified to claim that a new individual emerges when one can identify a germ-soma specialization, 
equating viability and fertility of the particle-level entities  (the cells) with viability and fertility of the 
collective-level entity (the multicellular organism) seems misguided.
It is  clear that a causal relation between viability and fertility at the two levels  exists, but viability and 
fertility of a cell and of a multicellular organism clearly refer to different processes  in most instances of 
multicellular organisms. To clarify this  point, let us  take a hypothetical multicellular organism such as  the 
one used or modeled by Michod and co-workers  (of the genus  Volvox) in different articles  (e.g., Michod, et al. 
2003; Michod & Roze 1999; Michod, et al. 2006). Let us imagine that this  multicellular organism starts  to 
develop through the multiplication of two lines  of cells: one that will perform the somatic function of the 
BOURRAT — LEVELS, TIME, AND FITNESS 5
OPEN ACCESS - Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
multicellular organism (for example keep the multicellular organism afloat), and one that will perform the 
germ function of the multicellular organism and will, once the organism has  reached adulthood, give birth 
to new multicellular organisms.
In this  hypothetical case, the terms  ‘viability’ and ‘fertility’ at the collective level do not respectively 
equate to the terms  ‘viability’ and ‘fertility’ at the particle level. In fact, during the phase of development of 
the multicellular organism - that is, when only the somatic or viability function of the organism is  performed 
- the somatic line has  offspring, and to do so the somatic cells  need both to survive and reproduce. Similarly, 
during the phase of reproduction of the multicellular organism the germ cells  both survive and reproduce. If 
this  reasoning is  correct, it means  that the only difference between the developmental and reproductive 
phases  of the multicellular organism from the point of view of cells  is  the distribution of their offspring cells, 
either in the multicellular organism for somatic cells  or its  offspring for the germ cells. Hence, not 
distinguishing the level at which the concepts  of viability or survival and reproduction or fertility are applied 
can lead to the odd claim that the fitnesses  of the cells of a multicellular organism are nil when those cells  do 
survive and reproduce. Another way to make the same point is to say that the viability and fertility of the 
multicellular organism result from the effort  of the cells  in those variables. Yet, if the invested effort of a 
particular line of cells  in the viability (fertility) of the multicellular organism is  nil, it does  not follow that the 
viability (fertility) of  the cell is nil. 
This confusion is  most vivid where Okasha summarizes  Michod’s  model of ETI from unicellular to 
multicellular organisms. Okasha writes: 
[Let us] consider the extreme case where there is  complete germ-soma specialisation— a cell either 
focuses  entirely on viability (so [fertility of the ith cell:] bi= 0), or entirely on fecundity (so [viability of ith 
cell:] vi= 0). Clearly, this  means  that each cell has  an individual fitness  (vi bi) of zero, so average cell fitness 
C is  zero too. Group fitness  G, however, defined in Michod’s  way, may be very high—essentially, because 
some cells’ null investment in v (or b) may be offset by other cells’ high investment in v (or b). Had group 
fitness been defined as average cell fitness, this would not be possible (Okasha 2009, 567).5
What seems  to be a confusion in this  quote is that a cell focuses entirely on the viability or fertility of the group, 
and not on the viability and fertility of the cell as Okasha suggests  when he writes  bi= 0 and vi= 0. In the case 
described by Okasha, only the effort in and V and B (respectively viability and fertility of  the group) are nil. 
In their models, Michod et al. assume that 
...for simplicity, […] the viability and fecundity of the group, V and B, respectively, are simple additive 
functions  of the cell properties  given by and [where bi and vi are, respectively, the 
viability and fertility of  the ith cell of  the group] (Michod et al. 2006, 262). 
They couple this  assumption with the assumption that when an ETI is  complete vi = 0  and bi = bmax for the 
germ cells  and bi = 0 and vi = vmax for the somatic cells. This  means that, at that point, V and B depend only 
on the viability of the somatic cells  and the fertility of the germ cells, respectively. It may be biologically 
meaningful to assume that the viability of some multicellular organism depends  solely on the viability of one 
particular type of cell that never reproduces, so that the effort in V matches  perfectly with the sum of the 
investment in v of the cells. However, assuming that the fertility of the multicellular organism depends  solely 
on the fertility of the cells - that is, that the effort in B matches  perfectly with the sum of the investment in b 
of the cells  that do not survive until reproduction - is  biologically meaningless, since one necessary condition for 
having offspring is  to be alive. In other words, following the assumption that the viability of the germ cells 
forming a multicellular organism is  nil, the fitness  of the whole organism should be nil because without 
existing, they could by definition not reproduce. 
3.2. Fitness and formal reproduction 
The previous  argument only undermines  Michod’s  export-of-fitness  model with respect to the 
assumption that the fertility of the organism is  only dependent on the fertility of the cells. But so far, the 
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assumption that  seems  plausible, at least for some specific cases,6 such as  when somatic cells 
never reproduce or when bi measures  the fertility rate of cells  across multicellular generations. In those cases, it 
can be tempting to assume, as  do Michod and colleagues  and Okasha, that the fitnesses  of somatic cells  are 
nil. In the remainder of  this section I show that one should resist this temptation. 
One way to show that the assumption that somatic cells  have a nil fitness  is  misled involves defining 
‘reproduction’ in a way that is  necessary and sufficient for evolution by natural selection to occur. Godfrey-
Smith (2009, 79-85) proposes  that a concept of reproduction which necessitates material overlap, such as 
that proposed by Griesemer (2000), is not suitable for a foundational description of Darwinian processes. 
Griesemer (2000) argues that for evolution by natural selection to occur, similarity between parents  and 
offspring is  insufficient. Material overlap involves  the offspring being made of the parts  of their parents 
(2000, 74). Godfrey-Smith prefers  the concept of formal reproduction, which only involves an unspecified 
relation of causality between the form of the ‘parent’ and of its  ‘offspring’ and thus  does  not require 
material overlap between the two. This  is  the concept I follow here. The main argument Godfrey-Smith 
provides  for preferring the notion of formal reproduction to the notion of reproduction with material 
overlap is  that there are cases  of in which there is  no material overlap that are classically recognized as cases 
of evolution by natural selection. The clearest example used by Godfrey-Smith is  of a retrovirus in which, 
due to reverse transcription, there is  no parental material of the parent present in its  offspring (Godfrey-
Smith 2009, 80). Many more examples  exist.7 In a recent article, Griesemer (2014, 36) asserts that he 
“accept[s  Godfrey-Smith’s] conceptual contrast of formal and material, but not his  reasoning about which 
are the material cases”. Griesemer shows that, depending on the scale or grain of description used and the 
choice of “central subjects” (a term borrowed from Hull (1975)), the case of the replicating retroviruses can 
be conceptualized in terms of material overlap. Although I accept that it might be possible to re-describe, in 
terms of material overlap, many cases  that would under an intuitive or classical approach be recognized as 
cases of formal reproduction, this  should not be a concern for me. It is  sufficient that, at a given grain of 
description and after having chosen central subjects, material overlap will not be an important criterion to determine 
whether a population is  evolving by natural selection. (For more on the notion of grain of description in 
evolutionary theory, see Bourrat 2014a, Chap 5).
In the case of reproduction of a multicellular organism, there seems  to be no material overlap between 
the somatic cells  of the parental organism and the offspring organisms. Thus, somatic cells  are not the 
material parents of the offspring organisms. However, things  are different if by reproduction we have in 
mind formal reproduction. In that case, one can argue that the somatic line of a multicellular organism does 
formally reproduce. To convince ourselves, let us  imagine a case of a multicellular organism composed of 
somatic and germ cells. Let us  further postulate that the fitness  of the multicellular organism depends  on 
both the number of somatic cells  and number of germ cells  it contains. If it is  composed of an insufficient 
number of somatic cells  its  fitness  plummets, for example because this  low number does  not allow the 
multicellular organism to remain afloat. Similarly, if it is  composed of too many somatic cells  (relatively to 
the total number of cells) its  fitness  also plummets  because with a higher number of germ cells  the organism 
could have produced more offspring organisms. The number of somatic cells  in the multicellular organism is 
thus as important as the number of  germ cell for the reproductive output of  the organism. 
For formal reproduction to happen, relatively to a particular grain of  description, the only requirement 
is the presence of  a causal link between the presence/absence of  a somatic cell in the parental organism and 
the overall number of  cells produced (number and quality of  offspring). That is precisely what Michod et 
al.’s models test: “we considered how a single new cell could maximize its fitness contribution to the group. 
In the optimization model we test whether small deviations by two or more cells could increase the fitness of  
the group” (2006, 262). Indeed, in Michod et al.’s models one can establish the causal relation between the 
parental and offspring cells by manipulating the presence or absence of  only one somatic cell in the parental 
organism and deduce that ceteris paribus one more somatic cell in the parental organism will lead to a higher 
number of  offspring cells composing the offspring multicellular organisms (thus either a higher number or 
better quality of  offspring organisms). Causation can thus be understood here under the manipulationist 
account of  causation (Woodward 2003, 2013), although Michod and colleagues do not make such a 
connection. According to Woodward (2013) the cornerstone of  the manipulative account of  causation is 
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that “if  C is genuinely a cause of  E, then if  I can manipulate C in the right way, this should be a way of  
manipulating or changing E”. In our case, manipulating the number of  somatic cells in the right way has 
consequences for the fitness of  the whole organism (see Figure 1 for a toy illustration).
In this scenario everything could be seen here as  if the somatic cells  were sending a message to the germ 
cells  to reproduce more cells  at the next generation.8 But does  the fact that somatic cells  are causally 
responsible for the production of somatic and germ cells  not undermine my argument? In other words, is  the 
fact that the manipulation of a number of somatic cells  does  not specifically alter the number of somatic 
cells  in offspring organisms  not a problem for my view? I claim that it is  not. In fact, for evolution by natural 
selection to occur, perfect reproduction is  unnecessary. The only requirement is  that some information from 
parents  and offspring is  conserved. Moreover, in that respect, the concepts  of formal reproduction and 
reproduction with material overlap are on a par. For example, germ cells  in the parental organism also 
produce the somatic cells of the offspring organisms. The only important property that matters  for somatic 
cells  of a given organism with regard to natural selection is  that their relative number, when compared to the 
overall population of organisms, increases  over time. Whether this  occurs through reproduction with 
material overlap or through formal reproduction does  not matter. Elsewhere I develop the concept of formal 
reproduction using a set of agent-based models  (see Bourrat 2014b). Another way to make this  point is  to 
notice that somatic and germ cells  have a relatedness  of 1 and thus, following standard kin selection theory 
(Hamilton 1964), the indirect fitness  of somatic cells  (as  opposed to their direct fitness) is  not nil. Yet, in kin 
selection theory the total personal fitness  of an individual is  measured as  the sum of the direct and indirect 
components  of fitness  (see Gardner & Foster 2008; West, Griffin, & Gardner 2007). Thus having a nil direct 
fitness does not necessarily mean that the total personal fitness of  a cell is nil. 9
To sum up, I have thus far showed that an ETI does not lead the particles forming a collective to have a 
nil fitness, as it has been argued by Michod and Okasha. This becomes clear when one does not apply the 
concept of  viability and fertility of  the collective to the particles and when the classical concept of  
reproduction is substituted with the more general concept of  formal reproduction. In this latter case, somatic 
cells do reproduce at each new multicellular generation of  multicellular organism and consequently their 
fitness cannot be said to be nil.
4. When Time Makes a Difference 
I turn now to claim (2). If claim (1) seems  unjustified in light of the above arguments, the claim made by 
Okasha and Michod that during an ETI an ontologically new level of selection is  created at the collective 
level, leading to two ontologically distinct levels  of selections  once the ETI is  completed, remains untouched 
by my arguments so far. 
According to Okasha, once an ETI is  completed, the particle and collective fitnesses  become 
incommensurable: one could not, even in principle, measure the fitness  of the collective in terms  of fitness  of 
the particles. Where does  such incommensurability come from? To this  question there no clear answer is 
given, and it is  hard to see how there could be one, even in principle. It is  in fact hard to imagine that 
collectives  could exhibit variations  in fitness  without their constitutive parts  exhibiting a form of variation 
with consequences on their own fitness. Yet Okasha believes  that such scenarios exist (Okasha 2006, 106) 
and that they materialize when MLS2 is  the framework of choice. For the MLS2 framework, he claims, fits 
two causally distinct processes  of natural selection happening in nature (Okasha 2006, 59; 2011, 243). Recall 
that in the MLS2 framework, the fitness  of the collective can be defined as a quantity “that bears no necessary 
relation to average particle fitnesses  alone” (2006, 136, my emphasis). Yet, in the same sentence Okasha 
surprisingly asserts  that “it is impossible that the resulting evolutionary change could be expressed in terms  of 
particle fitnesses alone” (Okasha 2006, 136, my emphasis). Beyond the fact that the claim does  not follow 
from the premise (Okasha should have used “sometimes impossible” instead of “impossible”), I propose one 
important reason why we should doubt this claim in any case. 
I will not argue here against the MLS2 framework itself, since it is  true by definition. Rather, I will show 
that the claim that there is  incommensurability between the particle and collective fitnesses  in cases in which 
there is  evolution by natural selection is  unwarranted. The argument I provide is  based purely on 
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methodological grounds  linked to time, fitness and levels  of organization and I illustrate it with one of 
Okasha’s own examples of  MLS2. 
In his  chapter 7 Okasha (2006) deals  with species selection, the paradigmatic case of MLS2 in the 
literature on the subject, and embraces Vrba’s  ‘acid test’ (1989, 155) to distinguish true species  selection (and 
more generally MLS2) from mere by-products  of selection at lower levels, as  in MLS1. Vrba proposes that 
there is  true species  selection when the outcome of selection at the species  level cannot be explained from the 
perspective of the organism. One stringent way (which represents  the test) to know when this  happens is  to 
seek different directions  of selection at the different levels  of organization. For instance, species  selection, if 
truly independent, could in principle counteract selection at the organism level. Vrba’s test will however be 
inconclusive when both selection processes  push in the same direction (see a discussion of this  problem in 
Jablonski 2008). The most parsimonious attitude, that is  the simplest one given the evidence, to adopt in such 
case will be to consider that selection only really occurs  at the lower level (see Figure 2), unless  one has some 
clear evidence of the contrary. Okasha (2006, 207) illustrates  one example of true species  selection satisfying 
Vrba’s  test with the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction.10 He asserts, following a classical 
interpretation, that asexuality is  advantageous at the organism level because of the two-fold cost of 
producing males  (Maynard Smith 1978), but that sexuality is  advantageous  at the species  level because it 
allows faster evolutionary responses  to rapid changes  in environmental conditions. According to this 
reasoning, sexual lineages  would be selected via species  selection as  a process of natural selection distinct 
from selection at the organism level (which favors asexual organisms). 11
One fundamental principle of experimental sciences, concomitant with the manipulationist 
account of causation, is that to establish causation, ideally one would change only one variable at a 
time while the others are kept unchanged or controlled in order to eliminate confounds. Controlled 
and randomised experiments rely on this idea since they are attempts to reach this goal (Fisher 1970; 
Shipley 2002). Thus to establish causation as opposed to a mere correlation, if one is interested in 
measuring the causal influence of X (e.g., a drug) on a population P, the experimenter will need to 
control the effect of X on P with another population (let us call it C for control) that was not 
administered X but is as similar to P as possible in all other respects. In such a case, if a difference is 
observed between the two populations, it will only be attributable to X because no other variable is 
different. However, if P and C are not strictly identical in all respects other than X, then any observed 
difference could be attributable to X or any of the other variables that differ between the two 
Figure 1. Toy illustration of  the formal causal relation between the presence/absence of  one somatic cell in a 
multicellular organism of  the genus Volvox and the number of  multicellular offspring produced.
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populations and which could have the same effect as X. Such variables are classically called 
confounding variables.12
How is that relevant to our problem of species selection and Vrba’s test? Vrba’s test is not a 
scientific experiment per se, but it shares with them the necessity to be controlled. Unless all of the 
variables relevant to selection are strictly identical at both levels in the test, the detection of a different 
direction of selection at those levels could be attributed either to a different process of selection at 
each level or to any other variable with different values at each level and with some relevance to the 
direction of evolutionary change. Just like any scientific experiment, Vrba’s test requires, ideally, that 
only one variable at a time is changed while all the others are kept unchanged. 
We noted earlier that Okasha claims that the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction is a 
true case of species selection. He justifies this assertion using Vrba’s test. Because, he argues, the test 
shows that selection pushes in two opposite directions (i.e. selection for sexuality at the species level 
and selection for asexuality at the organism level), a process of selection ontologically different from 
the process of selection at the organism level, must exist at the species level. But does Okasha’s 
comparison eliminate all possible (or at any rate all known) confounding variables, which could render 
his conclusion spurious? In other words, is selection at the organism level assessed in the exact same 
way as it is at the species level? The answer to this question is that it is not; Okasha has overlooked the 
issue of  confounding variables. 
To detect this confounding variable, let us use Okasha’s example once more and consider two 
types of organisms, one asexual and one sexual, under the same selection pressures. The so-called two-
fold cost of males occurs in sexual organisms, because only half of sexual organisms can reproduce 
(only the females) and they produce offspring of both sexes. On the contrary, asexual organisms are 
able to reproduce without partner and only produce female organisms. Hence if the two types of 
organisms are in competition, the asexual ones should quickly out-compete the sexual ones, because of 
the supplementary costs associated with sexual reproduction. A good example of this phenomenon 
within the same species is explained by Bouchard (2008, 2011). The Quaking aspen (Populus tremuloides) 
can reproduce both sexually and asexually, but Bouchard (2011) notes that the asexual clonal grove 
often beats the sexually reproducing individuals. In such cases, it is thus extremely tempting to claim 
that the fitness of an asexual organism is higher than the fitness of a sexual organism. In fact replacing 
“trait” by “sexual reproduction” or “asexual reproduction” in Figure 2 seems to yield two different 
levels of selection going in two opposite directions. But, if performed as such, the test is applied 
incorrectly. To apply it correctly, measures of fitness must be relativized over the same period of time 
at both levels of organization. This point has been made by Bouchard (2011) in the context of 
Figure 2: Vbra’s acid test
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comparisons of fitness between different of organisms. I make a similar point in the context of 
comparisons of  fitness between levels (see also Pocheville 2010, Chap. 2). 
In an environment that is perfectly stable all the time, it is very likely that most of  these proxies 
will be equally good. In such cases, having the reproductive output after one or after two generations, 
for instance, will make no difference in our estimation of  whether natural selection occurs between 
two or more types in a population. However, if  every two generations there are changes in the 
environment that affect the reproductive output of  organisms differentially, the reproductive output 
after one generation will be misleading if  one wants to know the evolutionary dynamics of  a 
population over periods of  time longer than two generations. Similarly, the reproductive output after 
two generations will be misleading if  one wants to predict the evolutionary change for a period of  
time shorter than two generations.
Thus, there is no ‘best’ period of time over which one should measure fitness for there is no 
definite environmental conditions that are the ‘true’ environmental conditions of an organism. This 
has led Beatty & Finsen (1989), Sober (2001), and more recently Abrams (2009) to propose a 
distinction between short-term and long-term fitness. Although they all consider that short-term and 
long-term reproductive outputs are fitness, it should be clear by now that my view is that they 
represent different proxies of fitness.
Proxies of fitness over long periods of time should be preferred if one is interested in 
evolutionary problems involving long term environmental changes, as is the case with the evolution 
and maintenance of sexual reproduction. This is because long term environmental changes and their 
consequences on selection pressures will be invisible to a proxy for fitness based on short term 
reproductive output. Increasing the period of time over which proxies of fitness are evaluated might 
represent a solution to problems identified by Ariew and Lewontin (2004). Yet, many evolutionary 
problems do not involve such changes and measuring fitness as the reproductive output over one 
generation is fine because the environment is stable enough. This is the case for instance if one wants 
to know what phenotype is optimal in a constant environment. 
The confounding variable, or more precisely variables, in Okasha’s comparison might now become 
more obvious to the reader. They are the environmental variables that changed with the measures of 
fitness made at the two levels. At the organism level, fitness is usually measured as the reproductive 
output after one organism’s generation. At the species level, fitness is measured as the rate of 
extinction or speciation over much longer periods of time, sometimes many millions of years. Thoday 
(1953), for example, considers that fitness should be measured as the probability of leaving a 
descendent after a period of 108 years. Speciation and extinction events are ultimately composed of 
the deaths, survivals and reproductions events of organisms over many generations, since the former 
events supervene on the latter. Thus, when Okasha applies Vrba’s test over the maintenance/evolution 
of sex, he compares the fitness of organisms over one generation at the organism level with the 
fitness of organisms over a much higher number of generations. Performed as such, Vrba’s test 
remains inconclusive. Indeed, the difference observed could be either due to two processes of 
selection pushing in opposite directions or to two measures of one and the same process of selection 
over different periods of time, pushing in one direction over the short term and in the other over the 
long term. In the rest of  the article, I defend the latter possibility.
To see why, let us now perform Vrba’s test while controlling the period of  time over which fitness 
is measured (Table 1b). Controlling time could be done in two ways: (1) by measuring the two fitnesses 
(at both the species level and the organism level) over one organism generation and comparing them 
over this period of  time; (2) by measuring the two fitnesses over the period of  time that would 
normally be used to measure species’ fitness, that is, a period long enough to detect events of  
speciation or extinction. Both alternatives seem to be doomed in practice, since we are neither able to 
measure the fitness of  species over short periods of  time, nor able to measure the fitness of  
organisms over periods of  time longer than a few generations. But if  we were able to do so, we would 
certainly find that ceteris paribus asexual organisms and asexual species have a higher short-term fitness 
as measured by (1) than sexual organisms and sexual species, but have a lower long-term fitness as 
measured by (2). The reason for this is not mysterious. Asexual organisms and asexual species on 
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average do better when the environmental conditions remain stable (as is usually the case over one 
generation) while sexual organisms and sexual species do better when new environmental conditions 
arise (which certainly occurs over several millions of  years). In other words, both selection at the 
organism and the species level go in the same direction once the test is controlled for the period of  
time over which fitness is measured.
Table 1a represents Vrba’s test performed on the regime of  reproduction at the organism and 
species level when the confounding variable, time, a proxy of  changes in the environmental conditions, 
is not taken into account. Table 1b represents the same test performed when time is taken into 
account. We can see that contrary to what happens when time is not taken into account, we expect 
selection on the regime of  reproduction to go in the same direction at the organism and the species 
level. 
Thus, Okasha’s claim that the evolution/maintenance of  sexual reproduction occurs as a result of  
species selection is inexact. If  we follow his reasoning, keeping the time over which fitness is assessed as a 
constant (meaning that the environment is the same at both levels), we predict no difference between a 
measure of  selection made at the level of  the organism and another one made at the level of  the species. 
The simplest interpretation of  difference in the direction of  selection over time is that one and the same 
process of  natural selection changes direction over time - not that two distinct processes are opposing each 
other (see also Bourrat 2015).
There is  no logical barrier to extending this  argument to all the other cases  for which MLS2 has  been 
the framework of choice. In each case, if fitness  could be determined over the same period of time, or more 
precisely in the same environment, at each level, what seem to be ontologically different levels  of selection 
could in principle be unified under one and the same process. Does  this  mean that the MLS2 framework 
should be abandoned and always replaced by the MLS1 framework? I claim that it should not, unless  one 
has  the full availability, at any point in time, of the selection pressures  on the particles under consideration. I 
can only see simple multilevel models as  satisfying these criteria. In practice, the complete list of selection 
pressures  an entity is  subjected to will most of the time be unknown, or they will be constantly changing (e.g. 
frequency dependent selection), making the particle fitnesses  extremely complex to determine over long 
Table 1a. Vrba’s test comparing the direction of  selection on the regime of  reproduction (sexual or asexual) 
without controlling for the time over which fitness is measured in organisms and species
Table 1b. Vrba’s test comparing the direction of  selection on the regime of  reproduction (sexual or asexual) 
controlling for the period of  time over which fitness is measured in organisms and species 
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period of time. When both particle and collective fitnesses  are available, and when the question at stake is 
about the collective, I propose that the MLS2 framework should be privileged. There are two further reasons 
for this  choice. First, the hard task of measuring the fitnesses  of all of the particles within a collective (with 
all the non-linear relations  it implies) and over many particles’ generations  will often materialize at the 
collective level into a single and easily measurable parameter: the collective’s  reproductive output. Second, 
keeping fitness  of the particles  and fitness  of the collective independent, as  it is  done in the MLS2 
framework, can reveal different, relevant information about selection pressures (for they are measured over 
different periods of  time). 
In light of these general considerations  on MLS2, what does  the MLS1/MLS2 distinction become in 
the context of ETIs and especially during their last stage? Would it be, in principle, possible, at the last stage, 
to describe the fitness  of a collective in terms of the fitnesses  of its  particles, contra Okasha? Following the 
reasoning I used in the case of the evolution/maintenance of sex, as  in any case of MLS2, I see nothing that 
would prevent this, as  long as  a multicellular organism is  nothing more than the cells it is  composed of.13 
During an ETI, if the fitness of the particles  seems  incommensurable with the fitness  of the collective, it is 
most probably due to the fact that, during the last stage, those fitnesses  are not measured over the same 
period of time anymore, and the interactions  between particles  become so complex that tracking back their 
fitness  over longer periods of time than one or two generations  appears  in practice impossible. Yet, what 
becomes decoupled in the two levels is not fitness per se but generations or life cycles. 
Because Michod’s proxy for fitness depends on reproductive output after one generation, if  “one 
generation” does not mean the same thing at the particle and the collective level, it is not surprising that 
collective and particle fitnesses seem decoupled from each other. This, in fact, is an artifact created by the 
measure. To see this, let us take again a take a toy example of  hypothetical multicellular organisms of  two 
types, A and B, that develop through cellular division and then reproduces at the multicellular level (see 
Figure 3).
Suppose that type A develops through a single totipotent cell (in red on Figure 3) into two totipotent 
cells, of  which one will lead to two germ cells (in green on Figure 3) and the other to one germ cell and one 
somatic cell (in blue on Figure 3, which we suppose unable to reproduce). Finally, suppose that this 
hypothetical multicellular organism is able to produce three offspring. Suppose now that type B, instead of  
waiting until the second cellular generation to differentiate the totipotent cells as somatic and germ cells, 
does so at the first cellular generation. As a result, at the third cellular generation, the multicellular organism 
of  type B is composed of  two somatic cells and one germ cell; that is, one somatic cell more and two germ 
cell less than type A. But imagine now that the fact that type B has one more somatic cell than type A at the 
third cellular generation allows it to have three more cellular generations than type A before producing the 
multicellular offspring (see Figure 3). This could be explained, for instance, by supposing that somatic cells 
gather resources for the multicellular organism and that having more resources allows for more cellular 
reproduction and a higher number of  multicellular offspring, with a priority given to the production of  
cellular offspring until a certain threshold of  germ cell is reached and multicellular organisms are produced. 
In the case of  type A in Figure 3, at the third cellular generation, all of  the resources gathered go to the 
production of  new multicellular offspring, while in the case of  type B, the resources gathered go to the 
production of  new germ cells in the cellular generations 4 and 5 and from that point the ressource gathered 
go to the production of  multicellular organisms. Because multicellular organisms of  type B have one more 
germ cell and one more somatic cell than multicellular organisms of  type A, they are able to produce one 
more multicellular offspring (as shown on Figure 3). I am assuming here that it takes the same absolute time 
to produce a new multicellular generation for both types and that multicellular organisms die immediately 
after reproduction. 
As we can see in Figure 3, if  we compare the measures of  cell fitness of  the two types with their 
measures of  multicellular-organism fitness using, respectively, one cellular generation and one multicellular-
organism generation, we find that type A has a cell fitness of  2 and a mutlicellular-organism fitness of  3, while 
type B has a cell fitness of  1.4314 and a multicellular-organism fitness of  4. Thus A seems to be fitter at the 
cell level and B fitter at the multicellular level. We seem to be in a case where one process of  selection pushes  
in one direction at the cell level and another in the other direction at the mutcellular-organism level (as in 
the case of  species selection developped earlier). Yet, this artefact quickly disappears if  we measure the 
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fitness of  the cells and multicellular organisms over the same period of  time. Then we can see that both 
selection at the cell and at the mutlicellular-organism level go in the same direction. In the example 
proposed in Figure 3, type A has a cell fitness (measured over the muticellular-organism generation from 
birth to death) of  3 and type B of  4, which are the same values as those obtained at multicellular level. 
Although the demonstrations provided here suggest that the MLS2 framework does not vindicate an 
ontologically distinct process of  selection from MLS1, it does not render the notion of  MLS2 useless. In fact, 
MLS2 is a very useful means to carve one single process of  natural selection both in time and space, and 
becomes especially useful once an ETI is completed. This echoes a recent criticism made by Waters (2011) 
about Okasha’s fundamentalism over the distinction between MLS1/MLS2 in which Waters claims that 
MLS1 and MSL2 frameworks are more conventional than fundamental. In a response Okasha (2011, 243) 
holds his ground, restating that they are fundamental. I have provided evidence here about their 
conventional status once measures of  fitness are controlled appropriately.
5. Conclusion
In this  article I have demonstrated three things. First, when doing a multilevel analysis of an 
evolutionary process, it is  important to use comparable concepts at each level. The terms  ‘viability’ and 
‘fertility’ and consequently ‘fitness’ cannot be used interchangeably when referring to the cell (and more 
generally the particle) and the multicellular organism (and more generally the collective). Although Michod 
and colleagues’ model formally distinguishes  the two, it assumes  a direct relation between viability and 
fertility of the cell and viability and fertility of the organism. I have shown that cell viability and fertility 
should not, to be biologically meaningful, be straightforwardly translated into viability and fertility of 
multicellular organisms, even in very simple cases (such as the ones proposed by Michod and colleagues). 
Second, I have shown that the concept of formal reproduction can be useful to consider during ETIs  and 
that it has the advantage of avoiding the odd claim that the somatic cells  of a multicellular organism have a 
fitness nil. 
Third, I have demonstrated that time is an extremely important parameter to take into account with 
respect to the concept of fitness  and more precisely fitness measures. I argued for its  relevance in ETIs  and, 
Figure 3. hypothetical case of  multicellular organisms with different life cycles
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more generally, in the levels  of selection debate. I used the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction as 
an illustrative example to establish that, if different proxies  of fitness  reflecting different time scales  are used 
at the organism and species  levels, this  will have the consequence of measuring selection pressures  over two 
different sets  of environmental conditions. This  can lead one to confound the existence of one unique 
process  of selection over two different periods of time with two ontologically distinct processes  of selection, 
one for each level. I then applied the same reasoning to ETIs  using a simple model and argued that they 
were not transitions  in processes  of selection, but rather events  for which MLS1 and MLS2 were alternately 
more relevant. 
The claim that distinction between collective selection and particle selection is conventional is not new 
(e.g. : Dugatkin & Reeve 1994; Sterelny 1996) and Kerr & Godfrey-Smith (2002) have formalized this 
equivalence. Yet, as Okasha (2006, 136) rightly points out, this formalism has been made solely in the 
context of  MLS1. Taking time as an important variable in measures of  fitness represents one important step 
towards a formalism in which any event of  selection traditionally described under the MLS2 framework, 
such as the last stage of  ETIs, could also be described under the MLS1 framework. A recent criticism, the 
exposition of  which would go beyond the scope of  this paper, calls into question the equivalence between 
particle and collective selection (conventionalism) in the MLS1 context (see Lloyd, Lewontin, & Feldman 
2008). This could undermine the claim I have made here about conventionalism between particle and 
collective selection. For my purposes here it suffices to note that whether this criticism holds is independent 
from the arguments provided in this paper, since the apparent incommensurability between fitnesses at 
different levels of  organization at least partially results from an artefact of  measuring fitness over different 
periods of  time at different levels of  organization. This is sufficient reason to take temporal scales seriously 
into account when making fitness comparisons.
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Notes
1. The distinction between particle and collective comes from Okasha (2006, 4). 
2. In the rest of the paper I at times  claim that MLS1 and MLS2 are commensurable. This should only be 
understood in the context of Okasha (2006) and Michod (2005) where they propose to give an ontology to MLS1 
and MLS2. It should be clear that Damuth and Heisler's initial distinction only regards MLS1 and MLS2 as two 
possible methods to study multilevel selection. They write: “Once one has decided to analyze a given situation in 
terms of multilevel selection processes both approaches [MLS1 or MSL2] are legitimate within that context and a 
choice has to be made depending upon what questions are of  interest” (Damuth and Heisler 1988, 411).
3. A cross-level by-product is defined by Okasha (2006,76) as “a side effect, or by-product, of selection acting at a 
different level”.
4. Michod and colleagues use the word ‘decoupling’ to refer to this phenomenon. By decoupling they mean that the 
fitness at the collective level becomes expressed in a different currency than fitness at the particle level and is not 
translatable into fitness at that level.
5. Okasha and Michod use “fecundity” instead of  “fertility”. These terms are equivalent.
6. There is, however, no scope for generality in Michod’s models.
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7. See for instance the cases  of prions  and LINE transposon provided by Godfrey-Smith (2009, 80). Kin selection, 
which is standard evolutionary theory, represents  another example in which the reproduction of one allele is done 
“indirectly”; that is, without material overlap (e.g., sterile workers helping the queen). Kin selection is a widely 
accepted model in evolutionary theory and thus represents, for my purpose, the clearest case of the sort of formal 
reproduction necessary and sufficient for evolution by natural selection to occur. 
8. This is to be taken here as a metaphor.
9. Incidentally, the model proposed here is  incompatible with Weismann’s  germ-plasm theory (1893), which is widely 
accepted in some subdisciplines of evolutionary biology.  Yet in the context of evolutionary transitions of 
individuality, Buss  (1983, 1987) has conclusively shown that early germ soma separation was only one minority 
mode of  development once all the taxa on Earth are taken into account.
10. For a survey of the issues surrounding the evolution of sex see West, Lively, & Read (1999) and the different 
commentaries on their article.
11. Some Authors (e.g., Damuth & Heisler 1988; Lloyd 1988; Lloyd & Gould 1993) have questioned the validity of 
Vrba’s acid test and more generally what she calls “effect macroevolution” (Vrba 1983).  However, Okasha (2006, 
207), relying on Grantham’s (1995) and Stidd and Wade’s (1995) analyses, shows that Vrba’s test is  valid. The only 
problem with the test according to Okasha, is that it should not focus on emergent properties but emergent level of 
selection. Although it is  not clear how emergent levels of selection could be independent from the properties of 
fitness bearers, for the sake of the argument I accept that Vrba’s test is valid and focus here on the notion of 
emergent level of  selection. 
12. Pearl (2000) and Shipley (2002) provide sophisticated statistical tools that rely, among other things, on the simple 
idea that correlation does not equate to causation for situations in which experimentally controlled and 
randomized experiments are impossible.
13. This will of course be a problematic assumption in many cases, but considering a multicellular organism to be 
made of cells and part of the cellular environment should be seen as the result of a change in grain of 
descriptions, not a change in level of  selection.
14. Since 6 cells are produced over 5 cell generations  this means that on average a cell produces 1.43 offspring cells 
per cell generation.
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